راه آهن در دوره رضاشاه

The project was an unmitigated economic folly, though this is not how it was viewed at the time by the majority of the politically conscious public. The criticisms levelled against this project can be summarised by two basic questions: 'Why from the centre north to the south west?"; and, 'Why a railway and not a road?". Both questions were raised by Dr. Muşaddiq at the very moment when the railway construction bill was submitted to the Majlis. He argued that an alternative route across the north-central regions  connecting Tabriz and Mashhad through Teheran  would be much more sensible; and he was right: this would have been cheaper to construct and maintain, for geophysical and other reasons; it would have reduced domestic and international transport costs across the country; and the higher freight and passenger demand would have led to greater capacity utilisation. The second question, "Why a railway and not a road?", was equally valid. There can be little doubt that a well constructed modern highway would have been cheaper both in domestic and in foreign currency to build and maintain; and it would have been ready for full utilisation earlier.15 The following suggestions may help provide some reasonable answers to both questions. The southern stretch, from Teheran to the Persian Gulf, must have been suggested by considerations of domestic military strategy: it made the main regions of ethnic and nomadic trouble much more easily accessible; indeed, it is likely that Reżā Shah conceived the idea in his earlier mission to Khūzistan to overthrow Shaikh Khaz'al. The northern stretch, from Teheran to Bandar Shah, must have appeared to serve a dual purpose: it connected Teheran to Režā Shah's own province of Mazandaran  where he had acquired extensive estates, and was about to confiscate many more and beyond it, on the edge of the Iranian Turcomanistan, with the lucrative cotton producing estates he was to purchase, usurp or requisition. It was also truly a trans-Iranian railway, which was part of the total vision. For similar reasons, a railway was preferred to a road: both the state and its clientele badly wanted a railway; a mere road would simply not have been good enough. Apart from that, the same considerations of domestic military strategy may have favoured the con- struction of a railway: usually, the transfer of heavy military equipment, and personnel, by railways is faster and more efficient; and this was certainly then the case in Iran.

Mohammad Ali Homayun Katoozian